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NINTH CIRCUIT DIGS DEEP WHEN REVIEWING FOREST
SERVICE DECISION
Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin
I. INTRODUCTION
Planning and managing millions of acres of forest is a fairly
complex job. Aside from the statutes and regulations, the National Forest
Service may now be facing a new standard of review. This new Ninth
Circuit animal eclipses the old arbitrary and capricious standard with a
level of scrutiny that allows judges to replace agency determinations.2
This case note will argue that the majority misapplied Lands
Council v. Powell3 to the case at bar. In doing so, the instant decision
imports a bright line rule for on-site analysis when a fact specific inquiry
is needed. The following analysis will address the court's decisions
regarding old growth and post fire habitats, with subsequent analysis on
soil quality in the present case and the impact it will have on future Forest
Service decisions.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Lolo National Forest ("Forest") is a national forest in the
northern Rocky Mountains of Montana composed of over 2 million acres.4
The Forest's diverse plant and animal species evolved in an environment
subject to "catastrophic" wildfires every 50-100 years.5 In 2000, the
Forest was struck by a catastrophic fire and lost approximately 74,000
acres.6 As a result of the wildfires, watersheds were degraded, soils were
430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005).
2 Id. at 1072.
395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005).
4 Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005)
(No. 03-35995).
5 Id. at 7. The Forest has provided approximately 1.2 million visitor days a year. Id. A visitor day
is equal to 12 hours of recreational use. Id.
6 Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1061. See also Appellant's Opening Brief at 8, Ecology Center, Inc.
v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-35995). The loss of 74,000 acres is equal to
roughly four percent of the Forest. Id.
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destabilized, sediment delivery to fishery habitats increased, roads that had
been covered by vegetation were now exposed, and the trees weakened by
the fires were more susceptible to disease and insect infestation.7 The
change in conditions however was not without benefit. In the wake of the
forest fires emerged a habitat for post-fire species.
The loss prompted the United States Forest Service ("Forest
Service") to develop a remedial plan known as the Lolo National Forest
Post Burn Project ("Project").9 Following public comment, the Forest
Service issued an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS")10 that
considered four plans, including a "no action alternative."" The EIS did
not mention the "huge cumulative effects problem" of eliminating twenty
percent of the black-backed woodpecker's habitat through a combination
of logging within the Forest and on adjacent private land.12
Prior to the 2000 fires there was such a shortage of habitat caused
by fires that the Forest Service considered the black-backed woodpecker
7 Answering Brief of the Federal Defendants-Appellees at 10, Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430
F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-35995). Trees damaged by the fires were more susceptible to
insect attack and created the potential for fuel accumulations that could in lead to future forest fires.
Id.
8 Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005)
(No. 03-35995). The black-backed woodpecker is a post-fire habitat dependent species. Id See
also Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ecology Center
feared that the Forest Service's impact analysis was inadequate to protect the black backed
woodpecker's habitat. Id.
9 Id.
10 42 U.S.C. § 432(C) (2000). An EIS is required for "major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment." Id. See also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S.
360, 373-75, 385 (1989). NEPA mandates agencies take a "hard look" at a project's environmental
effects. Id. See also Charles J. Nagey, 39A C.J.S. HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT § 118. When a federal
agency decides to execute a project an EIS is required to disclose the project's significant
environmental impacts. Id. The EIS's opinions and conclusions must be supported by adequate
facts and analysis. Id. Any conclusions the agency reaches must be accompanied sufficient
documentation and disclosures. Id.
1 Id. See also Answering Brief of the Federal Defendants-Appellees at 11, Ecology Center, Inc. v.
Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-35995). The EIS itself was a veritable forest. Id. It
contained 250 pages that analyzed the affected environment, over 160 pages devoted to the
Project's environmental consequences, and an administrative record with more than 20,000 pages
of supporting information. Answering Brief of the Federal Defendants-Appellees at 11, Ecology
Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-35995). See also Ecology Center,
430 F.3d at 1072.
12 Answering Brief of the Federal Defendants-Appellees at 11-12, Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin,
430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-35995).
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and other post-fire habitat dependent species "at extreme risk."" The EIS
indicated that the 2000 fires roughly doubled the amount of post-fire
habitat in the Forest to 19,219 acres. 14  The project originally proposed
salvaging 1020 acres although this was subsequently reduced to 815
acres. 15
In July of 2002 the Forest Service selected a version of
"Alternative Number Five" for the Project.16  The Ecology Center, Inc.
("Ecology Center") disapproved of "Alternative Number Five" because
the plan involved proscribed burning and salvage logging.' 7 The Ecology
Center opined that the plan as adopted would adversely affect the habitat
of the black-backed woodpecker, which is a sensitive species.' 8  The
black-backed woodpecker's habitat would be reduced by approximately
10% if the 815 acres designated in the EIS was salvaged.19
The Ecology Center's complaint asserted violations of the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §4332(C), and the
National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687.20
The Ecology Center asserted that the Forest Service's failure to assess the
13 Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1066.
4 Id. From 1993 to 1998 fires created approximately 11,000 acres of post-fire habitat or roughly
6% of the amount typically generated during an average six-year time period. Id. At the time of
the Project's inception there were 9,349 acres from pre-2000 fires. Id. The 2000 fires created an
additional 9,870 acres of habitat for the black-backed woodpecker and other post-fire habitat
dependent species. Id. There were 9,100 acres of habitat located in the Project area. Id.
15 Id. See also id. at n.5. The amount was further reduced to 155 acres by a settlement reached in
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Austin, 82 Fed. Appx. 570 (2003). Id.
16 Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1061.
17 Id. See also Ecology Center homepage http://www.ecologycenter.org/history.html (last visited
March 21, 2006). The Ecology Center was founded in 1969 during the early days of the
environmental movement in the United States. Id. Initially the Ecology Center focused on
disseminating information about the environment and public policy through its bookstore,
newsletter, library and printing press. Id. In 1971 a catastrophic oil spill occurred in the San
Francisco Bay and the Ecology Center organized volunteer clean-up crews. Id. Around this time
the Ecology Center began displaying support for the environment and took part in early recycling
efforts. Id. The Ecology Center's publication, Terrain, takes a broad approach to environmental
concems. Id. One of Terrain's focal points is on wilderness protection. Id.
18 Appellant's Opening Brief at 11, Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005)
(No. 03-35995); see also Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1061.
19 Appellant's Opening Brief at 12, Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005)
(No. 03-35995). There were approximately 1,280 acres logged on private land that abutted the
Forest. Id. In combination with the 815 acres designated in the Project the loss of potential habitat
was almost 20%. Id.
20 Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1061-62.
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effects of old-growth treatment on dependent species violated NFMA's
requirement to "ensure species diversity and viability." 21 Additionally, the
Ecology Center maintained that the Forest Service did not adequately
address the scientific uncertainties of treating the Forest's old-growth
areas in violation of NEPA.22  Ecology Center challenged the Forest
Service's action on a number of grounds. Ecology Center objected to the
impact of logging on old-growth habitat dependent species, the Service's
impact analysis of salvage logging on the black-backed woodpecker's
habitat, the possible impact of the Project on soil conditions in violation of
the Regional Soil Quality Standard ("RSQS"), and the dependability of the
soil quality analysis. 23
After finding that the Service's decision to permit logging was
arbitrary and capricious, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment in
favor of the Forest Service and directed the district court to enter summary
judgment for Ecology Center.24
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Forest Service litigation decisions have provided insight and raised
questions about what constitutes proper forestland stewardship under the
NFMA.25 Stewardship cases have put judges in a role that extends beyond
simply interpreting the law.26 Judges have used the information provided
by litigants, intervenors, and amici to formulate scientific inferences about
21 Id. at 1063.
22 Id. at 1065.
23 Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1061. See also id. at 1063. Ecology Center objected to the
scientific uncertainty surrounding the necessity, design and long-term effects of old-growth
treatment and believed that the old-growth treatment would adversely affect species that are
dependent on old-growth habitat. Id. See also supra note 13; Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1068.
The Regional Soil Quality Standard precluded the Forest Service from conducting an activity that
would "create detrimental soil conditions in fifteen percent of the activity area." Id Ecology
Center believed the methodology used to calculate the percentage of soil in a detrimental state was
unreliable because the Forest Service drew its conclusions from maps, samples throughout the
Forest, aerial reconnaissance, and computer modeling instead of directly observing soil conditions
in the activity areas. Id.
24 id
25 Anna M. Seidman & Douglas S. Burdin, Forest Wildlife Management: Legal Battleground for a
Scientific Dilemma, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 40, 40-41 (2005).
26 Id. at 40.
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what makes an effective wildlife management strategy. 27 The ultimate
goal is to better define the Forest Service's duties under NFMA.28
The NFMA directs the Secretary of Agriculture to "develop,
maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land and resource management plans"
for the units under the Forest Service's care and control.29 Diversity of
plant and animal species is among NFMA's paramount tenets,30 as is
maintaining "tree species similar to that existing in the region controlled
by the plan."31 In addition to requiring plans based on sound principles of
science management, the NFMA plans must also be open to public
scrutiny.32 The comment process allows the public to offer opinions
regarding proposed regulations and provide input during the planning
stages for individual forests under the Forest Service's care. 33
In 1982, the Forest Service promulgated regulations to fulfill the
requirements of NFMA.34 These regulations introduced the concept of a
"management indicator species" ("MIS") as a means to measure the effect
of management actions on other species. The growth or decline of a
designated MIS suggested whether or not agency actions adversely
affected other species.36 MIS viability is determined by evaluating the
quantity and type of habitat available in a designated forestry unit.37
Actions that will impact an MIS's habitat will not only affect its
population but also the population of species represented by the MIS. 38
This method of using an MIS as a harbinger for other species has been
dubbed the "proxy-on-proxy" approach.39 Courts differ as to whether the
27 id
28 id
29 16 U.S.C. §1604 (2000). Units are areas of the National Forest under the control of the Forest
Service. Id. See also Anna M. Seidman & Douglas S. Burdin, Forest Wildlife Management: Legal
Battlegroundfor a Scientific Dilemma, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 40, 40 (2005).
30 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2000).
31 Id
32 id
33 Seidman & Burdin, supra note 29, at 43. There were 7,000 original comments and a total of
190,000 comments submitted when the Forest Service undertook the 2005 Planning Regulations.
Id.
47 FR 43026-01; 47 Fed. Reg. 43,048; 36 C.F.R. §219 (1982).
3 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1982).
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1982 Forest Service planning regulations mandate "on-the-ground
counting" to reasonably assess population or if proxy-on-proxy is
sufficient.40
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the issue of whether the proxy-
on-proxy method is sufficient to satisfy NEPA in Inland Empire Public
Lands Council v. United States Forest Service.41 In Inland Empire, the
Forest Service planned to conduct a timber sale in Kootenai National
Forest and completed a site specific EIS with public comment.42  The
Public Lands Council and other plaintiffs asserted that the Forest Service's
EIS violated NEPA and NFMA for failing to conduct adequate population
viability research for "sensitive" species in the area affected by the Forest
Service's action.43 The plaintiffs also alleged violation of 36 C.F.R. §
219.19 because the Forest Service's "habitat viability analyses" was
insufficient." The district court granted summary judgment to the Forest
Service because the Forest Service's choice of scientific methodology was
entitled deference from the reviewing court.45 The Ninth Circuit court
held that the Forest Service's use of proxy-on-proxy methodology was a
reasonable indicator of species viability.46  Although the court was
unwilling to require assessment under regulatory section 219.1947 based
on population size, population trends, or the population dynamics of other
species, it did encourage the use of population assessments.48
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit's analysis was used in Idaho Sporting
Congress, Inc. v. Rittenhouse,49 which further clarified when habitat is a
reasonable indicator of species' viability.o In Rittenhouse several
40 Id. On-the-ground counting means inventorying actual wildlife populations through data
collection and evaluation. Id.
41 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996).
42 Id. at 758.
43 Id. Plaintiffs wanted the Forest Service to examine "the species' population size, their
population trends, or their ability to interact with other groups of the species living in neighboring
atches of forest." Id.
Id. at 760. Plaintiff's argued that 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 mandated the Forest Service to examine
the population of each species, the population dynamics, and whether each species could travel
between different patches of forest. Id.
45 id
4 Id. at 761.
47 36 C.F.R. § 219 (2006).
41 InlandEmpire, 88 F.3d 754, 761 n.8.
4 305 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2002).
50 Id
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conservation groups sought to enjoin timber sales in the Boise National
Forest and brought suit against the Forest Service for violations of NEPA
and NFMA. 5' The Boise Forest Plan used seven MISs in its proxy-on-
proxy approach to ensure viable wildlife populations.52 After reviewing
the Forest Service's record in combination with a monitoring report, the
court found the Forest Service's methodology inaccurate.53  The court in
Rittenhouse also relied on expert opinions to investigate the MISs' habitats
separately from the old-growth analysis. 54 The court held that the Forest
Service's use of the habitat as a proxy for viability violated NFMA
because the agency's decision rested on flawed methodology.55
Reliance on faulty data was again at issue in The Lands Council v.
Powell.56  The plaintiffs in Lands Council used NEPA and NFMA to
challenge a Forest Service timber harvest in the Idaho Panhandle Forest.57
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the final EIS failed to meet
NEPA's "hard look" requirement because there was no catalog of past
projects and no discussion of how those projects harmed the
environment. The court found that the Forest Service improperly used
51 Id. at 960.
52 Id. at 962.
5 Id. at 972. One area the Forest Service had determined to have 1,280 of old-growth for
dedication in actuality had none. Id. See also id. at 967-69. The Forest Service's methodology
contained incorrect assumptions regarding the sustainability of dedicated old growth, the amount
and definitions of old growth dedicated were inadequate, and the current plan's approach to
sustaining old growth was invalid. Id. After a series of forest fires destroyed 55,000 acres of
dedicated land the Forest Service failed to update its old growth assumptions. Id. The failure to
update the assumptions resulted in grossly inaccurate expectations for the old growth needed to
maintain the MIS. Id. at 967-69.
54 Id. at 972. Typically old-growth analysis can be used as a proxy for the pileated woodpecker but
in this instance the two habitats may not overlap. Id.
ss Id. The court once again reiterated its position in Inland Empire that although population
analysis is not required it is encouraged. Id.
s6 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005).
5 Id. at 1024. The proceeds from harvesting 1,408 acres were to be used to fund a watershed
restoration project in the Little North Fork of the Coeur d'Alene River. Id. See also id. at 1026.
Plaintiff's unsuccessfully attempted to convince to court to apply the "rule of reason" standard
instead of the arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. The court declined to grant the plaintiff's
request because the rule of reason review is not materially different from the arbitrary and
capricious standard and the Supreme Court applies the arbitrary and capricious standard to NEPA
review. Id. (citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)).
ss Id. at 1027. See also id. at 1027-28. When assessing a project's cumulative effects the EIS must
adequately catalog past, present, and future projects and analyze how the differences in projects
have affected the environment. Id.
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outdated survey data when it assessed the project's cumulative impact on
the habitat and population of the Westslope Cutthroat Trout.59 The Forest
Service's model used to predict in-stream sedimentation lacked key
variables, and the Forest Service failed to adequately disclose the model's
flaws in the final EIS.60  The court held that the lack of sufficient
61disclosure, not the use of the model itself, violated NEPA. In Lands
Council, the Forest Service predominately used proxy-on-proxy analysis,
in addition to some spot field surveys and on-the-ground detection. 62 The
Forest Service's database on snags, a proxy for the MIS, was found to be
outdated and inaccurate.63 Without the necessary habitat proxy variable,
an accurate assessment of species viability could not be made, and the spot
assessments were insufficient to cure the defect.6
The use of habitat as a proxy for species viability was again tested
in Native Ecosystems v. United States Forest Service.65  Native
Ecosystems claimed the Forest Service violated NEPA 42 U.S.C. § 4321
when it prepared an Environmental Assessment ("EA") rather than an EIS
and only considered two alternatives to the proposed Jimtown Vegetation
Project ("Jimtown Project") in the Helena National Forest.66  Native
Ecosystems also claimed that the Forest Service violated NFMA 16
U.S.C. 1600 et seq. because the Jimtown Project threatened the northern
goshawk's habitat. 67  The record showed that the Forest Service's EA
satisfied NEPA and provided the mandatory "hard look" before engaging
in projects that affect the environment.68 Native Ecosystems failed to raise
substantial questions about whether the Jimtown Project would have a
significant impact on the environment, and the court found that the Forest
' Id. at 1031.
6 Id. at 1031-32.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1036.
63 Id. "Snags are dead, standing trees, and they are a key habitat for the pine marten, one of the
Indicator Species. The database contains no information about this key habitat variable." Id. at
1036 n.24.
6 Id. The court poignantly spells out, "If the habitat trend data is flawed, the proxy on proxy
result, here species population trends, will be equally flawed." Id.
6s 428 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2005).
6 Id. at 1235. The Forest Service also considered a "no action" alternative. Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1244-45.
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Service's alternatives were sufficient.69 Upon determining that the data
used to identify the goshawk's habitat was accurate and the Forest
Service's action would leave sufficient habitat for the goshawk, the choice
to employ proxy-on-proxy was upheld.7 0 The court offered a two-part test
of when the proxy method should be upheld:
Our case law permits the Forest Service to meet the wildlife
species viability requirements by preserving habitat, but
only where both the Forest Service's knowledge of what
quality and quantity of habitat is necessary to support the
species and the Forest Service's method for measuring the
existing amount of that habitat are reasonably reliable and
accurate.7 1
The Eleventh Circuit analyzed the proxy-on-proxy method in
Sierra Club v. Martin.72 The Forest Service sought to allow logging in the
Chattahooche and Oconee National Forests ("CONF"), and the Sierra
Club alleged violations of NFMA because the logging would endanger
CONF's soil, watershed, fish, and wildlife.73 Specifically, the Sierra Club
asserted that NFMA required collecting and considering population
inventory information when a proposed, endangered, threatened, or
sensitive species of plants and animals ("PETS species") was present in a
project area.74 Sierra Club also claimed that the Forest Service violated 36
C.F.R. § 219 because it failed to procure population data for MIS.7 ' The
Forest Service argued that population studies are only mandated when
there is a "high potential for occupancy by PETS species."76 The Forest
Service conceded that sensitive species were located within the project
areas and would be destroyed by the logging, but it maintained that
because the species existed in other parts of CONF, the projects would not
69 Id. at 1249. See also id. at 1246-47. There is no "numerical requirement as the bellwether of
reasonableness." Id. The substance of the alternatives is the determinative factor. Id. Alternatives
that do not advance a project's stated purpose are not reasonable. Id.
70 Id. at 1251.
71 Id
72 168 F.3d I (11th Cir. 1999).
71 Id. at 2.
74 Id. at 3-4.
71 Id. at 5.
76 Id. at 4.
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adversely affect species viability or diversity.77  However, because the
Forest Service arrived at its conclusion without any inventory or
population data on the PETS species, the court held that the Forest Service
violated the Forest Plan's explicit mandate to gather adequate population
inventory information when a project area has a high potential for PETS
species occupation.78 The court found an obligation to "maintain
population data on all affected species" by reading 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 and
36 C.F.R. § 219.26 together. 79 The Forest Service was not obligated to
collect population data on all species, only MIS, because MIS is used as a
proxy to "measure the effects of management strategies on Forest
diversity" and requiring the Forest Service to collect inventory data on all
species would render section 219 nonsensical.80  The court differed in
opinion from the Ninth Circuit in Inland Empire, where habitat analyses
could serve as a sufficient proxy to comply with 36 C.F.R. § 219.19." For
the Eleventh Circuit, 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 required the Forest Service to
evaluate "both amount and quality of habitat and of animal population




7 Id. at 5.
"Forest Planning shall provide for the diversity of plant and animal communities and tree
species consistent with the overall multiple use objectives of the planning area. Such
diversity shall be considered throughout the planning process. Inventories shall include
quantitative data making possible the evaluation of diversity in terms of its prior and
present condition."
Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2006)).
"Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing
native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area ... (1) In order to
estimate the effects of each alternative on fish and wildlife populations, certain vertebrate
and/or invertebrate species present in the area shall be identified and selected as
management indicator species ... (6) Population trends of the management indicator
species will be monitored and relationships to habitat changes determined."
Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 219.26 (2006)).
so Id. at 6-7.
8 Id. at n. 10. See also supra notes 40-47.
82 Sierra Club, 168 F.3d 1, 7 (11th Cir. 1999). See also id. at 7 n.10. The court highlighted the
factual differences between the present case and Inland Empire. Id. In Inland Empire the Forest
Service used a site-specific EIS and detailed field studies before concluding that the MIS would not
be significantly harmed. Id. (citing Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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A. The Majority Opinion
The majority addressed the Forest Service's decision not to
directly monitor the impact of treating old-growth areas on post-fire
habitat dependent species.8 3 While conceding that an agency's choice of
methodology is entitled to deference, the majority also pointed out that the
rule is not absolute. 84 In order to comply with NFMA, the court found an
agency must demonstrate the reliability of the methodology used.
Otherwise, the methodology and decisions it produces would be
considered arbitrary and capricious.8 5  The court declined to adopt the
Forest Service's position that as long as a species' requisite amount of
habitat is maintained, a species is viable.8 6  The court held the Forest
Service's continued treatment of old-growth areas without observing the
effect on dependent species was arbitrary and capricious.87 The court
analogized the Forest Service's decision to a pharmaceutical company
marketing a drug without first determining the drug's safety and
efficacy. Just as the pharmaceutical company's decision to market
without clinical testing would be arbitrary and capricious, so too would the
Forest Service's decision to treat old-growth areas without verifying
whether treatment was safe and effective for a dependent species.89
The majority considered whether the EIS adequately addressed "in
any meaningful way the various uncertainties that surrounded the
scientific evidence."90 While the EIS did identify the public's concern
about treatment in relation to dependent species' viability, it did not
explain in sufficient detail the basis for those concerns nor did the EIS
address them. 91 Because the Forest Service decided to abstain from
further study regarding the public's concern without explaining why
further study was unnecessary, the majority held the Forest Service's
83 Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1063.
84 Id. at 1064.
85 Id. (citing Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 752) (9th 2004).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1065.
88 Id. at 1064.
89 Id
9 Id at 1065.
91 Id.
306
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analysis was inadequate under NEPA.92
The majority also took issue with the EIS's failure to adequately
explain why removing a portion of the habitat created by the fires would
not adversely affect the black-backed woodpecker's viability.93 Although
the 2000 fires did create additional habitat for the black-backed
woodpecker, the EIS did not contain sufficient data to determine whether
or not sufficient levels of habitat would remain after completion of the
Project.94 The EIS also fell short of NEPA's requirement to provide the
public with the environmental data the Forest Service expert used to
formulate its opinion.95 The Forest Service's inadequate explanation and
omission of information necessary to properly evaluate the EIS were held
to violate NEPA. 96
Next, the majority used the Forest's plan to determine whether or
not the black-backed woodpecker's viability would be adversely affected
by salvaging.9 7 The Forest Service did not provide an adequate factual
basis for the necessary analysis nor did it sufficiently explain its
decision.98 The Court found that the Forest Service's decision to permit
salvaging of the black-backed woodpeckers' habitat was arbitrary and
capricious because the court was unable to reasonably determine that
species' viability would not be adversely affected by salvaging.99 The
court found the Forest Service's decision violated NFMA 00.
The majority's final inquiry was directed at the Forest Service's
decision to verify soil conditions in the salvage areas after authorizing the
Project but prior to harvesting.10 1  The court was unconvinced by the
Forest Service's argument that RSQS was not binding because it was not
92 Id. Having found that that the Forest Service's decision violated NEPA and the NFMA, the
court declined to address the Ecology Center's concern that the project would adversely affect two
old-growth dependent species, the pileated woodpecker, and the northern goshawk. Id.
9 Id. at 1067. See also id. at 1065-67. The black-backed woodpecker classification as a "sensitive
N ecies" raises added viability concerns. Id.
Id. at 1067.
96 id




'0' Id at 107 1.
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incorporated into the Lolo National Forest Plan ("Plan").102 The court
found that because the draft and final EIS discussed RSQS it would be
arbitrary and capricious under NEPA to later ignore the standard. 0 3
Furthermore, the court held that the purpose of RSQS was to ensure
compliance with NFMA, and because the Project was not developed in
conformity with RSQS the Forest Service could not prove the Project
complied with NFMA.104 The court analogized the Service's actions in
the present case to the Forest Service's lack of testing in Lands Council.0 5
The court found that soil analysis from areas with similar ecological
characteristics to the proposed harvest areas was insufficiently reliable.106
The court reasoned that although field reports indicated a small percentage
of activity areas were directly observed, the record provided too little
information to accurately assess the report's reliability nor was there any
indication in the draft or final EIS that the Forest Service relied upon the
field reports when it made its final decision. 0 7 The court concluded that
the Forest Service's decision to verify soil conditions in the activity after
approving the Project did not distinguish the case at bar from Lands
Council and the Project violated NFMA. 0 8 The court also held that the
Forest Service's decision to authenticate the soil condition estimates after
it approved the Project failed to satisfy NEPA because "NEPA requires
consideration of the potential impact of an action before the action takes
place."l 09
102 Id. at 1069-70.
103 Id at 1069.
'0 Id at 1070.
105 Id
10 Id. (citing Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 752 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended by 395 F.3d at 1034).
107 Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1070-7 1.
10 Id. at 1071.
'" Id. (citing Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain, 137 F.3d 1380).
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B. The Dissent'1 0
Judge McKeown's dissent viewed the majority's decision as an
"intrusion into the administrative process" that unduly enhanced the
scrutiny courts apply to Forest Service scientific and administrative
judgments."' McKeown's primary concern was over the majority's
application of Lands Councilll2 to the case at bar.1 3  As applied by the
majority to this case, Lands Council now stands for the proposition that
soil walkthroughs are required in every case.1 4 While Lands Council took
issue with the Forest Service's lack of any on-site analysis, the majority
held that the Forest Service "failed to conduct enough of them."]' The
dissent argued that the majority's opinion permitted the court of appeals to
assess the detail and quality of an agency's analysis, "even in the absence
of contrary scientific evidence in the record."ll 6 In doing so the majority
no Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1071-78. Judge McKeown wrote the dissenting opinion. Id See
also Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 428 F.3d 1243, 1246-47. Judge McKeown
wrote the opinion for the majority. Id. In the opinion he made two points directly related to his
dissent in Ecology Center. Id. First, he pointed out the need for courts to defer to agency decisions
as mandated by the Supreme Court. Id. "When specialists express conflicting views, an agency
must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an
original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive." Id. (citing Marsh v. Oregon
Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378). Second, the number of alternatives contemplated by an
agency does not provide any indicia of reasonableness under NEPA. Id. The court is only to
examine the substance of the alternatives contemplated by the agency. Id. See also supra notes 64-
69; Sierra Club v. Austin, 82 Fed. Appx. 570 (2003). Judge McKeown joined the majority opinion
in Sierra Club, a case that scrutinized different facets of the Forest Service's Project following the
2000 fires in Lolo National Forest. Id. Specifically, the majority found that there was not "any
analysis of the project's impact on the potential for the unroaded areas to be designated as IRA's or
wilderness in the future." Id. But cf id. at 574-76 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). "The majority's claim
that there was no "analysis of the project's impact on the potential for the unroaded areas to be
designated as IRAs or wilderness in the future," Native Ecosystems Council, at 574-76 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (citing Memdispo at 7), is simply untrue." Id.
"' Id. at 1072.
112 Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2004).
" Ecology Center, at 1072-77.
114 Id. at 1073. The Lands Council court found that spreadsheet models, unaccompanied on the
ground walkthroughs (to verify the spreadsheet predictions) violated the NFMA. Id. A walk
though is an on-site analysis of the actual conditions thought to exist from data provided by
s readsheets. Id. at 1073.
"
5 Id. at 1075.
116 Id. at 1073. See also supra note 109 (providing for when a court must defer to agency
decisions).
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drew a bright line rule where case-by-case analysis belonged.11 7
The dissent argued the analogy of the Forest Service to a
pharmaceutical company went too far."' 8  The majority posited that
because it would be arbitrary and capricious for a pharmaceutical
company to "market a drug to the general population without first
conducting a clinical trial" so too was the Forest Service's decision to
"treat more and more old-growth forest without first determining that such
treatment is safe and effective for the dependent species."ll 9 The dissent
argued that aside from the differences between humans and trees, the FDA
process, with its substantive and administrative prerequisites for drug
approval through clinical tests, is not the same as NEPA and NFMA in
environmental actions.120 The dissent's opinion pointed out that the
majority's analogy demonstrated how far the majority was willing to inject
itself into the internal processes of the Forest Service.121 The dissent
maintained that the majority's opinion marked a departure from
established precedent to defer to an agency's expertise and experience,
especially on matters of engineering and science.122
V. COMMENT
Reviewing courts must give deference to an agency decision,
provided the agency's methodology is not arbitrary and capricious.' 23
Under this narrow scope of review a court is not to substitute its own
judgment for that of the expert agency.124 When the agency fails to
adequately articulate a sufficient correlation between relevant facts and the
decision made, a court shall overturn the agency decision as arbitrary and
capricious.125 The question in this case was whether or not the majority
crossed the line from reviewer to decision maker by extending the
"7 Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1075.




122 Id. (citing United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 887 F.2d 207, 213 (9th Cir. 1989).
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decision in Lands Council.12 6
Making accurate predictions for forest stewardship is a formidable
task because ecosystems are dynamic and constantly evolving. 12 7 In order
to ensure the predictions used for models remain accurate, the Forest
Service should use some type of "science consistency checks."l 28 Field
analyses, monitoring, and evaluation are the preferred methods to ensure a
model's accuracy.12
In Lands Council,130 the Forest Service did not conduct any on-site
inspections but instead relied on unverified spreadsheet predictions.' 3 '
The model used required on-site verification to ensure that the Forest
Service's predictions about soil quality were accurate. That was a clear-
cut case of an arbitrary and capricious decision. When a model requires
on the ground analysis, an agency is obligated to perform some degree of
on-site verification. Without some measure of on-site verification an
agency decision will be arbitrary and capricious. It makes little sense to
base policy decisions on an unverified model that has not been backed by
some guarantee that the predictions have, in fact, come to fruition.
What began as a case specific decision, Lands Council has been
transformed into a slippery slope for agencies. The specific circumstances
of the case indicated that reliance on spreadsheet models without on-site
spot verifications to affirm the model's predictions violated NFMA. 32
The substantive safeguards in NFMA do not specifically prohibit
reasonable scientific modeling nor is it prohibited by NEPA.1 3 We are
left with a standard that essentially mandates on-site verification when
126 Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).
127 Charles F. Wilkinson, Environmental Restoration: Challenges for the New Millennium: A Case
Study in the Intersection of Law and Science: The 1999 Report of the Committee of Scientists, 42
Auz. L. REV. 307, 315 (2000).
128 See generally id. at 316.
129 Id The article suggests that this may best be accomplished by independent scientists,
"including scientists from Forest Service Research." Id. The scientists from Forest Science
Research are not affiliated with land management and would provide an unbiased opinion. Id.
Allowing independent scientists (in addition to those from Forest Science Research) the
opportunity to provide analyses would help resolve the problems of inadequate funding. Id. It
would also be in line with the public policy of providing transparency in land management
decisions. Id.
130 Lands Council, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2004).
"' Id. at 1035.
132 Id
13 Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005).
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modeling is used but provides no indication of how much verification is
required.
The court's decision makes it difficult for an agency to predict the
de minimis level of on-site verification. In Ecology Center, the Forest
Service conducted the on ground walkthroughs that were lacking in Lands
Council.13 4  The Forest Service unsuccessfully argued that the
verifications it performed set it apart from the facts in Lands Council.3 5
We are left with no indication of how many more walkthroughs would
have satisfied the court and how many will be required in the future when
a policy decision is based on modeling.
VI. CONCLUSION
Now the question remains as to how much on-site verification
would have delivered the Forest Service from this new, harder to define
arbitrary and capricious standard. The answer is unclear and is equally
murky for future policy decisions. The Ninth Circuit has opened the door
for judges to supplant expert agency decisions with their own notions of
what sufficient verification is and what sufficient verification of a
reasonable scientific method is not.
SETH D. OKSANENI 36
34 Id. (McKeown, J., dissenting). See also 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (2000).
35 Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1068-70 (9th Cir. 2005).
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